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Abstract 
I conduct an on-line experiment to test the hypothesis that the divergence in behaver 
between men and women found in Mayo (2016) was caused by men and women following 
different economic norms.  The definition of norms is based on Bicchieri (2005), and includes 
three elements: First, that men and women exhibit different behavior.  This was shown in Mayo 
(2016) and is confirmed here.  Second, that men and women have different beliefs about what 
other men and women do and advocate be done when presented with the same options.  This was 
shown in the results of an incentive compatible compensated online survey.  Third, that 
providing messages about the behavior and statements of other men and women would cause a 
change in behavior.  This was tested with an online controlled experiment.  The results of this 
experiment were suggestive of the third element of the hypothesis, but did not prove causation.  
Further testing with higher statistical power is suggested. 
JEL Classification: C99, D31, D64 
Keywords: Charitable giving; Altruism; Gender 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, I use experimental data from a dictator game conducted over the internet to 
examine whether following different social norms is a cause of the significant difference in 
behavior between men and women found in Mayo (2016).  In that study, a modified dictator 
game was used to decompose giving into its altruistic and egoistic components in a within 
subject design, thus allowing a measurement of the warm glow effect (Andreoni 1989).  The 
experiment presented subjects selected to participate as dictators with a list of multiplication 
factors used to modify any amount they would send.  Multiplication factors ranged from 0.2 to 
5.0 and subjects were asked how much of their endowment they wished to send to an 
anonymously paired subject for each value.  After indicating their choices, one multiplication 
factor was randomly selected and the amount the subject had entered for that value was deducted 
from their endowment, modified by the selected multiplication factor, and send to the 
anonymously paired subject. 
That design held constant the price of the act of giving while varying the price of benefit 
to the recipient, thus allowing an estimation of the relative contributions of pure altruism and the 
warm glow of the act of giving as motivations for amounts sent.  It was found that women sent 
roughly the same amount for all values of the multiplier, while men sent significantly less than 
women at low multiplier values and significantly more than women at high multiplier values.  
The conclusion of that paper was that women are motivated primarily by the warm glow of the 
act of giving while men are primarily motivated by pure altruism. 
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I consider here an alternate explanation for the difference in behavior.  The pattern of 
choices made in the previous study are consistent with men and women following different 
behavioral norms.  Sending a constant positive amount that is insensitive to the varying price of 
benefit to the recipient is consistent with adherence to a sharing norm.  Sending a varying 
amount that is little or none when the multiplier is low and a large amount when the multiplier is 
high is consistent with following a norm of maximizing group wealth.    
Two bodies of literature are particularly relevant to this issue; studies of the difference in 
behavior based on gender, and studies on the role of norms in regulating economic choice.  That 
men and women make systematically different decisions in some economic contexts is neither a 
controversial nor new insight.  This topic has been extensively examined in the psychology, 
sociology, and economic literature (Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001), (Swope, K. J., Schmitt, and 
Shupp 2008), (Mansbridge 1991), (Deaux 1976).  Volume, however, has not equated to clarity.  
In prisoners’ dilemma games, some studies have found women to be more cooperative than men 
(Meux 1973), (Aranoff and Tedeschi 1968), (Jones et al. 1968).  Others have found women to be 
less cooperative than men, (Mack, Auburn, and Knight 1971), (Kahn, Hottes, and Davis 1971), 
(Rapoport and Chammah 1965).  And a third group have found no gender difference, (Orbell, 
Dawes, and Schwartz-Shea 1994), (Stockard, Van de Kragt, and Dodge 1988), (Dana, Cain, and 
Dawes 2006), (Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee 1977).  In addition, Gilligan (1982) claims that 
men and women follow entirely different conceptions of morality, with women focusing on 
relationship maintenance while men focus on rule adherence. 
Studies of gender in dictator games have also produced conflicting results.  Cox and 
Deck (2006) find that women are more sensitive to the price of giving, while (Eckel et al. 2017) 
find that women are less price sensitive.  Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find that women give 
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more than men when the price is high but men give more when the price is low, suggesting that 
women are more price sensitive to the cost of giving.  They also find that men are more likely to 
give an extreme amount (i.e. all or nothing) while women rarely do so. 
The body of research on the influence of social norms on economic choice is less 
conflicted.  A wide variety of papers have documented economic behavior that is modified by 
the knowledge of the behavior of others in the same situation, absent any strategic or reputational 
interaction.  This phenomenon has been found in dictator games (Krupka and Weber 2009), 
(Cason and Mui 1998); in gift exchange (Gächter, Nosenzo, and Sefton 2012), (Thöni and 
Gächter 2012), and in a trust game (Mittone and Ploner 2011). 
To test whether men and women follow different economic norms, a clear definition of 
norms is required.  For the purposes of this analysis, I adopt the definition of norms presented in 
Bicchieri (2005).  By this definition, a norm has three components.  1.) Empirical expectation: a 
set of beliefs about what others do in a given circumstance. 2.) Normative expectation: a set of 
beliefs about what others advocate be done in that circumstance. 3.) Conditional preference: a 
strategy choice in that circumstance that is predicated on the person’s empirical and/or normative 
expectation of others.  All of these three necessary and sufficient conditions for a norm to exist 
are relative to a reference group of persons.  For example, if I believe that other men in my office 
wear ties, and I believe that other men in my office believe ties should be worn in the office, and 
I prefer to wear a tie in the office because of those beliefs, then a norm exists relative to the 
reference group of men in my office.  My empirical or normative expectations about people not 
in my reference group, such as women in my office or men in another office, are not relevant to 
the norm.  It is important to also understand the difference between normative expectations and 
personal normative beliefs.  My normative expectations, in the office example, are that other 
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men in my office believe ties should be worn.  This is not the same as my personal belief that ties 
are useless and uncomfortable, and so should not be worn. 
Inserting this definition of norm into the statement that men and women follow different 
economic norms, makes the hypothesis testable.  The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows.  Section two describes the experimental design.  Section three reviews results.  Section 
four is discussion, and section five concludes. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Experiment Design 
2.1.1. Overview 
To conclude that men and women follow different economic norms in the variable price 
dictator game used in Mayo (2016), it is necessary to show all three components of the norm as 
defined in Bicchieri (2005), specifically that in that game: 
 Men and women make different choices. 
 Men and women have different empirical and/or normative expectations. 
 Men and women’s different choices are caused by their different expectations. 
That men and women make different choices was established in Mayo (2016).  A brief 
recitation of the relevant results is included below.  The second element, that men and women 
have different expectations about what others in their reference group do (empirical) and say 
should be done (normative), will be shown using an incentive compatible compensated survey.  
The third element, showing that the difference in beliefs causes the difference in behavior will be 
shown by a controlled experiment providing information to change beliefs and then observing 
choices. 
6 
 
 
2.1.2. Men and women make different choices. 
The core result from Mayo (2016) is shown in figure 1.  In a dictator game where the 
amount sent was multiplied by the experimenter prior to reaching the recipient, the multiplier 
had no significant effect on the amounts sent by women, but had a significant, positive effect on 
the amounts sent by men.  A full discussion of the results is found in that paper. 
Figure 1. Amounts sent by multiplier for men and women 
 
In Mayo (2016), subjects were presented with multipliers 𝜇 ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1,2, 3, 4, 5}.  For this paper, I examine only the behavior of men and women at multiplier 𝜇 = 0.2.  
I choose this value because it makes the clearest predictions from following a sharing vs. 
efficiency norm.  At 𝜇 > 1.0, a norm to share and a norm to maximize social total both induce 
sending a positive amount.  At 𝜇 < 1.0, a sharing norm would still induce sending a positive 
amount, but a norm to maximize social total would induce sending zero.  Assuming subjects do 
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not follow a single norm exclusively or perfectly, a difference in behavior due to following 
different norms should be most apparent at the lowest value of μ, in Mayo (2016) that was 0.2.  
The mean amounts sent at 𝜇 = 0.2 in that study were 20.4¢ for men and 28.2¢ for women. 
2.1.3. Men and women have different empirical and/or normative expectations. 
Empirical and normative expectations were found using a compensated survey.  The 
survey was run online using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk micro-employment website for 
recruitment and payment.  A discussion of the technology used is in section 2.2 and the 
experiment interface as seen by subjects is included in appendix A.  Subjects received a $0.25 
base payment, equivalent to a show-up fee in an in-person laboratory experiment.  After reading 
and accepting an IRB disclosure, but prior to starting the experiment, prospective subjects were 
asked to answer this question: “You have a basket containing five apples. You eat one apple and 
sell two apples.  How many apples are now in your basket?”  This question serves to prevent 
automated scripts from entering the experiment, similar in function to CAPTCHA1 codes seen on 
websites where automated spam is a concern.  Subjects were not allowed to enter the experiment 
without entering the correct answer.  Upon entering the experiment, subjects were told that they 
would see the instructions from a prior study, and would then be asked questions about the 
choices they think participants in that study made.  To encourage subjects to give accurate 
responses, they were told that the person whose answer was closest to what people in the other 
study actually did, would be paid $20, in addition to their base participation fee.  In case of a tie, 
the bonus payment was split evenly. 
After reading the instructions from the prior study, subjects were randomly assigned to be 
asked either “In the previous study you have just read about: What was the average amgount sent 
                                                 
1
 Examples of the use of CAPTCHA systems is available at 
https://www.google.com/recaptcha/intro/index.html. 
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by men?” or “In the previous study you have just read about: What was the average amgount 
sent by women?”  Subjects were only askeed about one gender to eliminate possible consistency 
and sequence effects.  Responses to these questions gives me the beliefs of men and women 
about what both men and women do; their empirical expectations.  On the following page, 
subjects were asked “In the previous study you have just read about: How much do you think 
should be sent?”  To elicit second order beliefs rather than first order beliefs (e.g. what I think 
you want, not what I want) subjects were told that the person whose answer was closest to the 
average answer would receive an additional payment of $20.  Answers to this question give me 
subjects’ normative expectations.  Finally, subjects were asked their gender which allowed the 
prior two answers to classified by gender. 
2.1.4. Men and women’s different choices are caused by their different expectations. 
To show causation, I use an experiment design adapted from Bicchieri and Xiao (2009).  
In that study, subjects were shown information derived from a prior study (Xiao and Houser 
2007) of both what other subjects did and what they said should be done.  Data from different 
sessions was used to construct multiple different yet truthful statements2.  These statements were 
“60% of subjects in a prior session…” followed by a statement that the subjects either made a 
fair choice (FC), a selfish choice (SC), stated a fair belief (FB), stated a selfish belief (SB), FC 
and SB, or SC and FB, followed by an opportunity to make a choice themselves.  The purpose 
being to alter the normative or empirical expectations of the subjects then observe any resulting 
change in choices. 
                                                 
2
 The issue of experimental deception was addressed in that paper to the effect that so long as subjects are 
informed that the information presented is only a part of the data and not claimed to be representative of the entire 
data set, no deception has occurred.  
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I adapt this design by presenting subjects with the same instructions as were seen in the 
incentivized survey, and are given the stated initial endowment of $1.00.  On the next screen 
subjects are shown two things: information about what subjects in a prior study did and said, and 
a question of how much they want to send to an anonymous, randomly paired person in another 
group.  In Bicchieri and Xiao (2009), two of the six information treatments (FC + SB, FB + SC) 
pushed empirical and normative beliefs in opposite directions and so eliminated, within reason, 
the possibility of experimenter demand effects.  In the other four treatments, however, this was 
not the case.  The authors state that the double-blind procedure should protect against this 
possibility as the subjects knew that the experimenters could not know who made which choice.  
While this may be sufficient, I guarded against this possibility by providing information that (if 
effective) would push choices in opposite directions in every treatment.  Data was selectively 
drawn from responses in Mayo (2016) to construct the following four truthful statements: 
“Before you make your decision, here is information about select groups from 
a previous study. These responses may not be representative of everyone in the 
previous study.” plus one of the following four statements: 
 The most frequent amount that MEN: 
ACTUALLY sent         SAID should be sent 
$0.50 
 
$0.00 
 
The most frequent amount that MEN: 
ACTUALLY sent         SAID should be sent 
$0.00 
 
$0.50 
 
The most frequent amount that WOMEN: 
ACTUALLY sent         SAID should be sent 
$0.50 
 
$0.00 
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The most frequent amount that WOMEN: 
ACTUALLY sent         SAID should be sent 
$0.00 
 
$0.50 
Subjects were randomly assigned to see one of the four statements.  In addition, whether 
“actually” or “said” appeared on the left or right of the screen was also randomized. 
Below this information was a request to choose how much to send.  On the next page, 
subjects were asked their gender and exited the experiment. 
If subjects’ preferences were not conditional on their empirical or normative 
expectations, then providing them with information about what others did or said should be done, 
and thus modifying those expectations, would have no effect on their choices.  However, if 
subjects’ preferences were conditional on those expectations, and if the new information changed 
them, then a change in choices may be observed.  Since the amounts sent and said should be sent 
were always opposite ($0.00/$0.50 or $0.50/$0.00), the direction of change would indicate which 
expectation, empirical or normative, had the causal effect.  For reasons discussed in the next 
section, subjects in the recipient group are recruited in a separate asynchronous session. 
2.2. Tools 
The design described in the previous section was implemented online using oTree and 
Mechanical Turk. 
2.2.1. oTree 
oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016) is a software package for running multi-
player decision experiments over the internet.  oTree experiments are coded in Python using the 
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Django web framework.3  Experiments are developed on a local machine, and then iploaded to a 
remote server for internet access. The experiment software was hosted on Heroku4.  Since the 
experiment is available online, the only technology required for subjects’ computers is a normal 
browser using any operating system.  The experiment can be accessed through a desktop 
computer, laptop, tablet, or even a phone.  Django automatically re-scales the pages to best fit 
each screen size.   
2.2.2. Mechanical Turk 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk micro-employment website was used for subject recruitment 
and payment.  The experiment was posted to Mechanical Turk using IRB approved 
advertisement language.  Workers who chose to participate are shown the experiment interface 
inside a window on the Mechanical Turk Website.  To guard against automated scripts 
generating random responses to generate payments, the script filtering question discussed in the 
previous section was used before both the incentivized questionnaire and the controlled 
experiment. 
Interaction between dictators and recipients are asynchronous.  All dictators make their 
choices of how much to send, then later a second group of Mechanical Turk workers is recruited 
as passive recipients.  Participants in the dictator group are ineligible to participate in the 
recipient group.  Since the information flow is only from dictator to recipient, the small time 
delay this method imposes between money sent and money received should not bias dictator 
choices.  No Mechanical Turk worker was allowed to participate in any part of the study more 
                                                 
3
 Technical details of Django can be found at https://www.djangoproject.com/. 
4
 Technical details of Heroku can be found at https://www.heroku.com/. 
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than once.  This was enforced through assigning a “worker qualification” to participants and 
excluding workers who already possessed the qualification.  
2.3. Security and randomization 
No personally identifying information is passed from worker to experimenter other than a 
Mechanical Turk worker identification number.  Amazon securely stores workers’ personal 
information including financial information required to process payments.  This simplifies 
experimenter record keeping and ensures subject privacy. Through the oTree API, a worker 
qualification can be set.  This tells Mechanical Turk that the requester only wants the task to be 
visible to workers who meet certain criteria.  The criteria used in this experiment were that the 
worker must reside in the United States, not have previously participated in the experiment, must 
have previously completed at least 100 work assignments with a satisfactory rating of at least 
90%.  The latter two conditions were imposed to exclude persons who have not learned how to 
use the Mechanical Turk website or who tend to enter random responses. 
The only information workers see prior to accepting the assignment is an IRB disclosure 
and a generic description of the task as an academic experiment in decision making.  Therefore, 
self-selection into the experiment should not occur.  Methodological questions about the external 
validity of experiments conducted on-line without control of subjects’ environments have been 
examined and found to not be a significant problem (Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011).  
Payments in on-line experiments using Mechanical Turk can be much lower than the same 
experiment in an in-person laboratory.  Amir, Rand, and Gal (2012) studied both issues by 
replicating a series of classic economic experiments in an on-line environment and found no 
significant difference between the behavior of on-line and in-person subjects.   
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3. Results 
3.1. Compensated survey 
The compensated survey was run over three consecutive weekday evenings between the 
hours of 4PM and 10PM Eastern time.  163 Mechanical Turk workers participated in the 
experiment.  There was rough gender balance with 91 (56%) male subjects and 72 (44%) female 
subjects.  Since each subject was asked only about a single randomly chosen gender, there were 
four sub-groups.  Amounts subjects believed were sent in the prior study are shown in table 1.  
Amounts subjects said should be sent are shown in table 2. 
Table 1. Summary statistics of the amounts subjects believed were sent in the prior study. 
 N Mean Median St. Dev. 
Men asked about men 50 0.331 0.250 0.307 
Men asked about women 41 0.476 0.500 0.359 
Women asked about men 27 0.299 0.250 0.264 
Women asked about women 45 0.481 0.500 0.338 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of the amounts subjects said should be sent. 
 
N Mean Median St. Dev. 
Men 91 0.353 0.325 0.338 
Women 72 0.390 0.500 0.400 
 
As shown in figure 2, the beliefs of men and women are similar.  Both genders believe 
that men send less than women.  Results of a one-way between subjects ANOVA to compare 
mean amounts in the six groups is shown in table 3. The p-value of 0.024 provides significant 
evidence of difference.  A post-hoc test of pairwise comparison of means with Duncan correction 
for multiple comparisons is shown in table 4. 
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Figure 2. Amounts subjects believe were sent and should be sent. 
 
Table 3. One-way ANOVA of amounts by group. 
Source Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F P-value 
Between groups 1.048 3 0.349 3.23 0.024 
Within groups 17.165 159 0.108   
Total 18.213 162 0.112   
 
Table 4. Pairwise comparisons of means 
Comparison of means Diff. Std. Err. t-statistic p-value 
Men believe women send vs. men believe men send 0.146 0.069 2.11 0.037** 
Women believe men send vs. men believe men send -0.0.3 0.078 -0.40 0.690 
Women believe women send vs. men believe men send 0.155 0.068 2.23 0.035** 
Women believe men send vs. men believe women send -0.177 0.081 -2.17 0.040** 
Women believe women send vs. men believe women send 0.004 0.071 0.07 0.946 
Women believe women send vs. Women believe men send 0.182 0.080 2.27 0.038** 
p-values are adjusted with Duncan correction for multiple comparisons. 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10% 
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The difference of beliefs within gender and similarity across gender is visually apparent 
in figure 2.  Pairwise comparisons in table 4 confirm the visual observation. 
Result 1: Men believe that women send more than men and the difference is 
statistically significant. 
Result 2: Women believe that women send more than men and the difference is 
statistically significant. 
For the amounts, they believed should be sent (personal normative beliefs rather than 
normative expectations), the mean for men was $0.35 and the mean for women was $0.41.  This 
is consistent with the prior result, however as shown in table 5 the difference was not statistically 
significant.   
Table 5. Two sample t-test assuming equal variance of amounts men and women believe should be sent. 
 Men Women 
Mean 0.346 0.409 
Variance 0.137 0.135 
Observations 91 72 
t-statistic -1.080  
p-value (two tails) 0.282  
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10% 
 
Result 3: The amount that women believe should be sent is greater than the amount 
men believe should be sent, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
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3.2. Controlled experiment 
241 Mechanical Turk subjects participated in the controlled experiment.  There was 
rough gender balance with 123 (51%) men and 118 (49%) women.  Given the 2 x 2 x 2 design, 
amounts sent are in 8 groups, i.e. Men/women x told that men/women x sent $0.50 and said 
$0.00/sent $0.00 and said $0.50 as shown below with brief names in parentheses. 
1.) Men who were told men sent $0.50 and said $0.00 should be sent. (men men hi) 
2.) Men who were told men sent $0.00 and said $0.50 should be sent. (men men lo) 
3.) Women who were told women sent $0.50 and said $0.00 should be sent. (women women hi) 
4.) Women who were told women sent $0.00 and said $0.50 should be sent. (women women lo) 
5.) Men who were told women sent $0.50 and said $0.00 should be sent. (men women hi) 
6.) Men who were told women sent $0.00 and said $0.50 should be sent. (men women lo) 
7.) Women who were told men sent $0.50 and said $0.00 should be sent. (women men hi) 
8.) Women who were told men sent $0.00 and said $0.50 should be sent. (women men lo) 
Groups 1 through 4 show the effects of information about the same gender, while groups 
5 through 8 show the effects of information about the opposite gender.   Summary statistics for 
the amounts each group sent are shown in table 6.  Amounts sent as box plots are shown in figure 
3. 
Table 6. Summary statistics of amount sent for each treatment group. 
Group N Mean Median St. Dev. 
Men men hi 28 0.22 0.00 0.28 
Men men lo 39 0.15 0.00 0.21 
Women women hi 32 0.36 0.50 0.26 
Women women lo 30 0.26 0.50 0.26 
Men women hi 33 0.24 0.00 0.33 
Men women lo 23 0.12 0.00 0.19 
Women men hi 27 0.27 0.25 0.30 
Women men lo 23 0.12 0.20 0.21 
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It is visually apparent that both genders sent more after receiving information that either 
gender sent $0.50 compared to the amounts sent after receiving information that either gender 
sent $0.00.  The median amount sent by men in all treatments was $0.00, while the median 
amount sent by women in all treatments was between $0.20 and $0.50.  The results of two 
sample unpaired t-tests of the difference between amounts sent after receiving information that 
the same gender sent a high ($0.50) and low ($0.00) amount are not statistically significant, as 
shown in tables 7 and 8. 
Table 7. Two sample t-test comparing amounts sent by men told that other men sent $0.50 vs. $0.00 
 $0.50 message $0.00 message 
Mean 0.221 0.153 
Variance 0.080 0.045 
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Observations 28 39 
t-statistic 1.139  
p-value (two tails) 0.259  
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10% 
 
Result 4: Men sent less after receiving information that other men sent nothing, but 
the result is not statistically significant. 
Table 8. Two sample t-test comparing amounts sent by women told that other women sent $0.50 vs. $0.00 
 $0.50 message $0.00 message 
Mean 0.358 0.262 
Variance 0.070 0.072 
Observations 32 30 
t-statistic 1.418  
p-value (two tails) 0.161  
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10% 
 
Result 5: Women sent less after receiving information that other women sent 
nothing, but the result is not statistically significant. 
As a comparison, the model shown in equation 1 was estimated using quantile regression, 
which at the median is the same as least absolute deviation.  Given that subjects’ choices of 
amount to send were constrained to be between $0.00 and $1.00, and both values did occur in the 
data, the data may5 be censored and so OLS regression could not be relied upon to produce 
unbiased estimates.   Quantile regression was selected as a substitute over Tobit estimation since 
                                                 
5
 The fact that responses above/below a threshold will be coded at the threshold, and a substantial number 
of observations are at the threshold is necessary but not sufficient evidence of censoring.  A simple visual test to 
confirm censoring is the presence of a substantial number of observations near, but not at, the threshold.  In the 
absence of such observations the more likely explanation is that the observed distribution is the same as the latent 
distribution.  This may be caused by the data having multiple data generating processes that have not been separately 
modeled.  Histograms and kernel density plots are included in the appendix for evaluation of this issue.  For a 
comprehensive discussion of these issues, see Greene (2008) pp 875-881.  
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unlike quantile regression, Tobit estimation is both parametric and highly sensitive to assumption 
violations (Arabmazar and Schmidt 1982), (Arabmazar and Schmidt 1981), (Maddala and 
Nelson 1975).  Regression results are shown in table 9. 𝑠 = 𝛽1𝑔𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽2ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 ∗ ℎ𝑖 + 𝜖                             eq.1 
Where: 𝑠 = 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑒𝑛 = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒0 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 } 
ℎ𝑖 = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑠 $0.500 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑠 $0.00} 
𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 = { 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟0 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟} 
Table 9. Quantile regression results, N = 241, Pseudo R2 = 0.0987. 
Variable Estimate 
D_Gender, 1 = Female 0.250 (0.000) 
D_Sent high, 1 = Subject told others sent $0.50 0.00 (1.000) 
D_Same gender, 1 = Information is about the same gender 0.00 (1.000) 
D_Sent high*D_same gender 0.200 (0.165) 
Constant 0.000 (1.000) 
D indicates a dummy variable 
p-value in parentheses 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10% 
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The coefficient for the dummy for gender is positive and highly significant, indicating 
that women sent more than men. 
Result 6: Women send more than men at μ = 0.2.  The result is statistically highly 
significant.  This result in Mayo (2016) is confirmed. 
The interaction term between receiving a message that others sent $0.50 (D_Sent high) 
and that message being about the same gender as the receiver of the information (D_Same 
gender) is positive, but not significant. 
Result 7: Subjects who received information that the same gender sent $0.50, sent 
more, but the result is not statistically significant. 
4. Discussion 
The results reported in the previous section show significant evidence in support of two 
of the three elements necessary to prove that in the context of a dictator game with a multiplier of 
0.2, men and women follow different economic norms.  The first element, that men and women 
make different decisions was shown in Mayo (2016) and is confirmed in this study.  The second 
element, that men and women have different empirical and/or normative expectations is also 
shown.  Both men and women believe that women send more in this game than men.  This is 
evidence of different empirical expectations.  The evidence of different normative expectations 
is, however, inconclusive but not necessary to prove the proposition.  The remaining necessary 
element is to show that the preferences of men and women are conditional on the behavior and/or 
advocacy of those in their reference groups.  Do men and women define their reference groups as 
same gender persons or all persons?  The evidence that both men and women believe that women 
send more than men is consistent with same gender reference groups.  If reference groups are 
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same gender, then we would expect that receiving information about the behavior of persons of 
the same gender would have a larger effect on behavior than receiving information about the 
behavior of persons of the opposite gender.  This effect is seen in the sample, as men who were 
told that men sent a high amount sent more than did men who were told that women sent a high 
amount.  The same effect was observed among women, i.e. women changed their behavior more 
when given information about other women than when given information about men.  Although 
this is consistent with the hypothesis that men and women follow different economic norms, the 
effect is not statistically significant.  The p-value of the interaction of message and same gender 
in the regression is 0.165, which is suggestive but nothing more. 
What are the possible explanations for this?  The first possible explanation is simple, that 
the hypothesis is wrong; men and women do not follow different economic norms.  Failure to 
reject the null hypothesis does not imply that the null is correct, so consideration of other 
possible explanations is warranted.  As discussed previously, in Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) the 
majority of treatments used a message containing a single piece of information, e.g. that men 
made a fair choice, or that women had selfish beliefs.  This introduces the possibility of 
experimenter demand effects magnifying the effect size.  Although their argument as to why this 
did not occur is reasonable, I chose to employ an additional safeguard by always presenting 
subjects with two, opposite pieces of information, e.g. men sent high and said you should send 
low, or women sent low and said you should send high.  Assuming both pieces of information 
had some effect on choices, then the observed effect would that of the dominant effect minus the 
lesser effect.  If the effects of changing normative and empirical expectations were roughly the 
same, then no aggregate effect would be seen.  The purpose of Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) was to 
determine which factor was dominant and they found that empirical expectations, but not 
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normative altered subjects behavior.  This is consistent with the finding here that behavior did 
shift towards the empirical signal, but cannot be ruled out as an explanation. 
Another possible explanation is a lack of statistical power.  A power analysis conducted 
on the results shown in table 7, testing whether men who received a message that other men sent 
a high amount and said a low amount should be sent, subsequently sent a different amount than 
men receiving the opposite message.  Power analysis results are shown in table 10. 
Table 10. Post-hoc power analysis: unpaired t-test. 
Parameter Value 
Tails 2 
Effect size d 0.312 
α-level 0.05 
df 65 
N high 28 
N low 39 
Mean sent high 0.221 
Mean sent low 0.153 
S.D. high 0.283 
S.D. low 0.121 
Power 0.237 
 
Any of the previously discussed explanations for the results are possible, but it is obvious 
that my tests were underpowered.  A power of 0.237 implies a probability of 0.763 of type II 
error.  Assuming the effect size remained constant, a n increase in sample size from 67 to 550 
would be needed for significance at α = 0.5.  Given the low cost of experimentation using 
Mechanical Turk, this is not an unreasonable sample size.  Unfortunately, the budget for this 
study did not allow for the larger samples that may have provided a conclusive answer.   
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5. Conclusion 
This paper reports the results of an on-line experiment designed to test the hypothesis that 
the divergence in behaver between men and women found in Mayo (2016) was caused by men 
and women following different economic norms.  The definition of norms used included three 
elements: First, that men and women exhibit different behavior.  This was shown in Mayo (2016) 
and is confirmed here.  Second, that men and women have different beliefs about what other men 
and women do and advocate be done when presented with the same options.  This was shown in 
the results of an incentive compatible compensated online survey.  Third, that providing 
messages about the behavior and statements of other men and women would cause a change in 
behavior.  This was tested with an online controlled experiment.  The results of this experiment 
were suggestive, but did not prove the third element of the hypothesis, possibly caused by low 
statistical power.  
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Appendix A. Compensated survey interface. 
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Appendix B. Controlled experiment interface. 
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